| nettime's roving correspondent on Thu, 14 May 1998 18:37:39 +0200 (MET DST) |
[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]
| <nettime> Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas |
[From Le Monde diplomatique <dispatch@london.monde-diplomatique.fr>,
info at <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/>]
_________________________________________________________________
A CENTRAL AMERICAN CLASSIC
Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas
(translated from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/dossiers/chiapas/ )
At first glance, it would be both unjust and almost
irrelevent to blame the Mexican authorities for the murder
of 45 inhabitants of the Chiapas village Acteal on 22
December 1997. As soon as the news broke out, President
Ernesto Zedillo described the massacre as "cruel, absurd and
unacceptable". On 3 January 1998 Minister of Interior Emilio
Chuayffet tendered his resignation, followed on 7 January by
Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, Governor of the State of Chiapas. As
early as 9 January, 46 people were arrested and charged.
Among them were the priista (1) mayor of Chenalho, Jacinto
Arias Cruz (accused of providing the murderers with vehicles
and weapons), and the director of public security of the
State of Chiapas. After a swift investigation, 113 people
were jailed.
Control of the electorate in the federation's states,
especially in rural areas, has long been in the hands of
local oligarchies and casiques. Given the current discourse
of the central government in support of a more democratic
political system (witness the victory of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas
of the Democratic Revolution Party as mayor of Mexico), it
is hardly surprising to see local oligarchies distancing
themselves from control from the centre, which they fear
intends to change the rules of the game that have always
assured them domination and impunity.
But there is more to be said. On 26 December 1997 Jorge
Madrazo, Attorney General of the Republic, went to the scene
of the crime, expressed his solidarity with the victims and
offered his explanation of the events. "Since the 1930s acts
of great violence have been witnessed in the commune of
Chenalho and other communes of Chiapas and this situation
has unfortunately never disappeared. These conflicts can be
labelled as inter-communal in the context of constant
disputes between local political and economic powers. They
also stem from the existence of religious diversity and,
more recently, ideological divisions (2)".
This is an overly simplistic explanation. Just between
1982-88, under the governorship of General Castellanos,
human rights organisations recorded 153 political
assassinations in Chiapas (inter-communal?), 692 abusive
incarcerations (disputes?), 503 sequestrations accompanied
by torture (religious diversity?), 407 expulsions of
families from their communities, 54 expulsions from
villages, 12 rapes and 29 attacks against protest movements.
In 1988 and 1990, the state's penal code was revised,
penalising various offences said to be "political",
including the occupation of public roads and public
buildings and "tumultuous" gatherings, all of which are
traditional means of expression of peasant populations (3).
This series of violations of basic rights was not unrelated
to the January 1994 uprising and was a far cry from the
usual "local disputes". On 23 January, in Kanasin (Yucatan),
President Zedillo pledged not to use force to resolve the
Chiapas conflict. This was all very well. But at the same
time, the defence minister was sending several military
detachments to the area to "re-establish a climate of
security and avoid confrontations between rival groups".
This is a return to a strategy developed in the 1980s in
Central America by, among others, the Christian Democrats in
Salvador: a democratic government "squeezed" between two
extremes - of the far left and the far right - which did not
differentiate between an armed social movement (the Frente
Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional - FMLN) and the death
squads. And, on the pretext of fighting the death squads, it
attacked the FMLN. It was no secret that a proliferation of
paramilitary groups - Peace and Justice, the Chinchulines,
the Red Mask, the Throat Cutters, the Alliance San Bartolome
de los llanos, the Mixed Operations Brigades, the Indigenous
Anti-Zapatista Revolutionary Movement, the Tomas Muntzer
Community, etc. - were operating in Chiapas, sowing terror
and causing massive population displacements, with the
passive - if not active - complicity of the army and the
authorities.
An investigation revealed that former military and police
personel had trained Red Mask, the group held responsible
for the Acteal massacre. The arrest on 2 April of General
Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz (until then in hiding) confirmed
the involvement of the army at its highest level: the
general commanded a detachment of 40 troops posted nearby,
who could have prevented the tragedy, but failed to do so.
This shows the strategy (and the real responsibility) of the
authorities: the "militarisation" of a large portion of the
territory and an appeal, albeit more discreet, to the
paramilitary (by nature "uncontrollable") to embark on a
sweeping repression of the whole social movement.
The tragedy of Acteal is only one unfortunate "bungle" which
came to public attention both because of its extent and,
consequently, the reactions it produced - not only
internationally. Negotiations carried out between the
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the
government had allowed the signing in February 1996 of the
San Andres Accords. Based on these accords, the Commission
for Reconciliation and Peace (Cocopa), comprising delegates
of all parties represented in parliament, presented a bill
integrating their content into state legislation, which
would mean a reform of the constitution.
The minister of the interior, Francisco Labastida Ochoa said
on 1 March 1998: "If the government signed the San Andres
Accords, it was obviously to comply with them. The president
of the republic has on numerous occasions stated that the
government will stand by its commitment: this is not
negotiable. Whoever says otherwise would be telling a lie.
The Cocopa has drawn up a proposal of constitutional reform.
This project has never been approved by the government. We
have never committed ourselves in this area. Nothing has
been signed". In fact, the authorities, alleging that
indigenous autonomy and its effects would constitute an
encroachment upon national sovereignty and the unity of
Mexico, have reneged on their commitments.
A government bill on constitutional reform presented on 15
March 1998 by President Zedillo was rejected by the
Zapatistas and by the main opposition party, the Democratic
Revolution Party (PDR). The EZLN refuses to renew
negotiations but the Zapatista social bases are unilaterally
implementing the Accords by forming 38 autonomous
municipios. More than the EZLN (which has not fired a single
shot since January 1994), it is this process of pacific
social organisation led by the indigenous people that the
authorities intend to crush. As in Central America, where
"the guerrilla moves amongst the people as fish in water",
the objective is to take the water away from the fish. A
large portion of the rural population of Chiapas now live in
a state of military occupation. And the paramilitary groups
have instituted a reign of terror. All the authorities need
do is to restore the discretion necessary to any campaign
aimed at regaining control. Since 1996, 4,435 foreigners
have accessed the conflict zones, most of them members of
some 200 non-governmental organisations (4).
What we see here is, more or less, and without any formal
link, a process successfully applied in Guatemala in the
early 1990s: the presence of international observers with
two major missions: to dissuade, by their presence,
violations of human rights, and to spread information to the
outside world. In the context of an official campaign
against foreigners who are being accused of "manipulating
the indigenous", some fifteen people were "shown out" of the
country between 13 and 16 April. A 67 year-old Frenchman,
Michel Chanteau, priest of Chenalhe for the past 32 years,
was also expelled, accused of "pro-Zapatista activism"
(three other members of the clergy had been similarly
treated).
Repression, isolation and silence: these are the ingredients
which accompanied the "pacification" campaigns applied in
Central America not so long ago.
______________________________________________
(1) Member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party which
has held power for over 60 years.
(2) Le Mexique aujourd'hui, Information service of the Mexican
embassy, Paris, no. 68-69, December 1997-January 1998.
(3) "Rapport Mexique", Federation internationale des ligues
des droits de l'homme (FIDH), no 251, February 1998.
(4) El Pais, February 13 1998.
MAURICE LEMOINE.
<Maurice.Lemoine@Monde-diplomatique.fr>
_________________________________________________________________
See also :
* The fourth world war has begun,
by sub-commandante Marcos, août 1997.
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/08-09/marcos.html
On the Web
----------
* EZLN. - http://www.ezln.org/
* FZLN. - http://spin.com.mx/~floresu/FZLN/
* Sipaz. - http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/
* Tendance floue. - http://www.chez.com/tf/
* Zapatistas in Cyberspace. -
http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Le Monde diplomatique. - http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/
---
# distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission
# <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism,
# collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets
# more info: majordomo@desk.nl and "info nettime-l" in the msg body
# URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@desk.nl